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TAX LAW
I. NEW METHOD APPROVED FOR APPORTIONMENT OF CORPORATE
TAXABLE INCOME
In an effort to achieve a fair result, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals stretched statutory language to the breaking
point in Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc. v. South Carolina
Tax Commission.' In Lockwood the court sought to prevent a
multistate taxpayer from distorting the amount of its income
taxed by South Carolina. Affirming the Tax Commission's inter-
pretation of section 12-7-1190 of the 1976 code,2 the court ap-
proved a method of income apportionment that compared pay-
roll paid for services performed in South Carolina to total
payroll. The decision broadens the scope of the statute and gives
the Tax Commission flexibility in apportioning corporate taxa-
ble income for a variety of businesses.
As a corporation with offices in South Carolina and four
other states and with clients and projects in South Carolina and
numerous other states, apportionment is the proper tax method
for Lockwood to use when reporting its income to South Caro-
lina. This method divides the income of a multistate business
among the various states in which it does business. Section 12-7-
1190 provides the South Carolina apportionment formula for
businesses that do not deal in tangible personal property. A dis-
pute arose as to the meaning of the phrase "gross receipts from
within this state." Lockwood apportioned a share of its income
to South Carolina based on the "origin of payment" view. Lock-
wood argued that the disputed phrase referred to the location
1. 293 S.C. 447, 361 S.E.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1190 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides as follows:
If the principal profits or income of a taxpayer, other than those described
in former 1962 Code § 65-256 or § 12-90-100, are derived from sources other
than manufacturing, producing, collecting, buying, assembling, processing or
selling, distributing or dealing in tangible personal property such taxpayer
shall make returns and pay annually an income tax upon a proportion of its
remaining net income computed on the basis of the ratio of gross receipts from
within this State during the income year to the total gross receipts of such year
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from which it received its fees, where its customers were located.
Lockwood compared gross receipts from clients located in South
Carolina to its total receipts. On the other hand, the Commis-
sion apportioned Lockwood's South Carolina income based on
the "place of activity" view. According to the Commission, the
phrase referred to the place where the services were performed,
where its income was earned. In order to determine gross re-
ceipts from services performed in this state, the Tax Commis-
sion compared the payroll Lockwood paid to its employees for
services performed in South Carolina to its total payroll. The
circuit court held that the place of activity view was correct, and
Lockwood appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's interpreta-
tion of section 12-7-1190 as the approach that recognized the
proportion of the engineering firm's business actually carried on
in South Carolina. A statutory provision should be given a "rea-
sonable and practical construction consistent with the purpose
and policy expressed in the statute."' The purpose of the alloca-
tion statutes is to provide for imposition of South Carolina in-
come tax "upon a base which reasonably represents the propor-
tion of the trade or business carried on within this state."4 The
court of appeals found the place of activity view to give a rea-
sonable result and recognized the proportion of Lockwood's bus-
iness carried on in the state. Since the client pays for services of
the firm's employees, the services rendered by its personnel de-
termined by its payroll is a reasonable measure of an engineer-
ing firm's business carried on in the state. An unreasonable re-
sult would occur under the origin of payment view.' The court
viewed Lockwood's business as similar to law firms, accounting
firms, entertainment and sports companies, and hospital man-
agement companies, which are controlled by Tax Commission
guidelines focusing on where services are performed.
Lockwood is a fair decision although the court faced the dif-
ficulty of applying a narrow statute to a broad, diverse category:
3. Hay v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 273 S.C. 269, 273, 255 S.E.2d 837, 840
(1979).
4. Hertz Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 246 S.C. 92, 95, 142 S.E.2d 445,
446 (1965) (quoting 1958 S.C. Acts 731).
5. If engineering services are performed in South Carolina for an out-of-state cli-
ent, income from the gross receipts are attributed to the client's state, rather than to
South Carolina, even though all the work is performed in South Carolina.
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all businesses that do not deal in tangible property. The statute
is clear and exact on its face, but the method prescribed proba-
bly does not always yield a result consistent with the statute's
purpose. The statute refers to receipts, not services, payroll, or
even the vague concept of where income is "earned." Legislative
intent, however, must prevail.' "A client pays an engineering
firm for the expertise and time of its employees. Therefore, an
engineering firm's business carried on in a state is reasonably
measured by the services rendered by its personnel in the
state."
1
One-third of Lockwood's payroll is in South Carolina, which
indicates that one-third of Lockwood's business was carried on
in this state. Therefore, legislative intent would dictate that
Lockwood apportion one-third of its income to South Carolina.
Under the place of activity view, Lockwood would apportion its
income to South Carolina based on the ratio of direct job payroll
for services rendered in South Carolina to total direct job pay-
roll for services rendered everywhere. Thus, if Lockwood's total
payroll is $60,000 and its payroll attributable to services per-
formed by its engineers in South Carolina is $20,000, Lockwood
must report one-third of its total income to South Carolina
under the place of activity view. This figure follows the apparent
legislative intent.
Only ten percent of Lockwood's receipts, however, are "from
within" South Carolina. Using the origin of payment method,
Lockwood would apportion its income to South Carolina based
on the ratio of its gross receipts from clients located in South
Carolina to its total receipts. Thus, if Lockwood's gross receipts
from clients in South Carolina are $100,000 and its total receipts
are $1,000,000, Lockwood must apportion one tenth of its in-
come to South Carolina. This result is not the intent of the legis-
lature, although it is consistent with the language of the statute.
When faced with another relevant statute that gave an un-
fair result, the Supreme Court of South Carolina chose to base
its decision on legislative intent. In Hercules, Inc. v. South Car-
olina Tax Commission, 8 the court chose not to apply section 12-
6. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 250 S.C. 187, 191, 156
S.E.2d 769, 771-72 (1967).
7. 293 S.C. at 449, 361 S.E.2d at 347.
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7-1120.' Under apportionment, 1.5 percent of Hercules' income
was allocated to South Carolina. The Tax Commission used sec-
tion 12-7-1120 to argue that the total gain was South Carolina
income and was not subject to apportionment. The court was
concerned that application of the statute in question would re-
sult in double taxation. Hercules affirmed the taxpayer's posi-
tion and resulted in less tax for South Carolina.
Previous decisions by South Carolina courts indicate that
the court should have interpreted the disputed phrase narrowly.
A clear and unambiguous statute requires that the plain lan-
guage of the statute control.10 Further, tax statutes are to be
construed strictly against the state and in favor of the tax-
payer.1" Finally, the Tax Commission has no authority to enact
new laws in the nature of regulations. 2 Conversely, the court in
Emerson Electric Co. v. Wasson held that "[t]he construction of
a statute by an agency charged with its administration is enti-
tled to the most respectful consideration and should not be over-
ruled absent compelling reasons."1 3 The court needs to have ad-
equate reason to overrule a Tax Commission construction that is
in conflict with the plain language of a statute. The Lockwood
court, however, did not address the plain language of the statute
but, instead, based its decision on the purpose of the statute.
Possibly the court did not overrule the construction because the
Tax Commission's interpretation was consistent with the pur-
pose of the statute.
The court expanded the statute in order to arrive at a result
consistent with the legislative purpose, rather than the language
of the statute. This result is compatible with the law in other
states. While South Carolina considers only gross receipts, most
states solve the problem of fair apportionment for corporations
not dealing in tangible property with statutes that apportion in-
come on a three-factor formula based on property, payroll, and
sales. These states deem a "sale" to have been made in the state
when the services producing income are rendered in the state.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
10. State v. Goolsby, 278 S.C. 52, 53, 292 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1982).
11. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129,
149, 103 S.E.2d 908, 918 (1958).
12. Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 126 S.E.2d 15 (1962).
13. 287 S.C. 394, 397, 339 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1986).
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Iowa, like South Carolina, uses gross receipts as the sole factor
in apportioning the income of service businesses. Whether gross
receipts are taxable to Iowa depends on where the services are
performed. The Iowa statute, however, does not contain an ap-
portionment method but delegates the authority to establish
one.
A question arises as to the possibility of double taxation for
a business that apportions income to South Carolina and to an-
other state which uses the three-factor formula. Given the
proper fact pattern, the corporation could experience a distor-
tion in its tax liability. That problem, however, arises because of
the single-factor formula used in South Carolina versus the
three-factor formula used in other states and not the interpreta-
tion of South Carolina's statute."
The court's decision results in a flexible rule but gives few
guidelines to businesses trying to comply with section 12-7-1190.
The Tax Commission has applied guidelines to eight different
categories of businesses.1 New corporations will have to predict
whether or not they fit into one of these categories. In doubtful
situations, businesses will have to depend on a case-by-case de-
termination of whether the court will apply gross receipts, pay-
roll, or some other standard. Businesses have warning, however,
that the court will expand the statute in order to achieve an eq-
uitable result.
The courts should not be placed in a position of stretching
the construction of a statute in order to achieve justice. Efforts
should be made to amend the statute to allow the Tax Commis-
sion to establish the rules needed to comply with the purpose of
the allocation statutes or to replace the designated method with
broader language.
Delores A. Timko
14. If a business had 100% of its property, 100% of its payroll, and 50% of its
receipts from another state, and none of its property, none of its payroll and 50% of its
receipts from South Carolina, it would apportion its income at 83% to the other state
and 50% to South Carolina. This could be normal for a finance company on the border
of two states. It does not matter whether the single factor is payroll or receipts. The
result is the same.
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